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THE SUPREME COURT'S CATHOLIC




Since the confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito in 2006, the
Supreme Court has had a Roman Catholic majority for the first
time in its history.' With the appointment of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor in 2009, Catholics now constitute two-thirds of the
High Court's bench.2 While the emergence of this Catholic
majority may be of uncertain significance,' it has undoubtedly
generated an abundance of interest and commentary. Some of
this commentary has explored such diverse topics as the history
of Catholic judges, the politics of judicial appointments, or the
appropriateness of using religion as a criterion for nomination.4
I Visiting Assistant Professor, Vermont Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. I am grateful to all who have offered comments and engaged in
helpful conversations about earlier drafts. I would like to extend particular thanks
to Charles Donahue, Noah Feldman, Tara Grove, Dan Meltzer, Eloise Pasachoff,
Eduardo Pefialver, Jessica Reyes, Joseph Singer, Mark Tushnet, and the organizers
and participants at the Religious Legal Theory Conference at St. John's School of
Law. All remaining errors are my own.
1 Lynette Clemetson, Alito Could Be 5th Catholic on Current Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A23; see .also Sheldon Goldman, The Politics of
Appointing Catholics to the Federal Courts, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 193, 193 (2006)
(noting that "the Court has a majority consisting of Roman Catholic justices for the
first time in American history").
2 The six Roman Catholic members of the Court are Chief Justice John Roberts
and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor. See Laurie Goodstein, Sotomayor Would Be Sixth
Catholic Justice, but the Pigeonholing Ends There, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at
A20; see also Lisa Desjardins, Sotomayor Would Be Part of Court's Catholic Shift,
CNN.COM (May 27, 2009, 3:09 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/27/
sotomayor.catholic/.
' See Matthew J. Franck, The Unbearable Unimportance of the Catholic Moment
in Supreme Court History, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447, 451
(2006).
4 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 1 (arguing that while role of religion in
appointment of Catholic justices has varied throughout American history, at present
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But most of the scholarly analysis has focused on one issue in
particular: the role of Catholic religious faith in judicial decision-
making.5
More specifically, the academic literature has tended to focus
on the potential for conflict between a Catholic judge's religious
beliefs and her legal duties.6 It is well known that Catholic
doctrine is at variance with American law on a range of
subjects-divorce, capital punishment, and abortion are but a
few examples.7 What happens when a Catholic judge is called
upon to act in the context of these subjects? Do religious faith
and legal duty necessarily conflict when a family court judge is
faced with a petition for divorce, or when an appellate judge is
called upon to review a death sentence in a criminal case? What
about when a Supreme Court Justice is presented with an
opportunity to overrule Roe v. Wade?' And if there is a conflict
between religious faith and legal duty, how is the Catholic judge
to resolve it?
A number of legal scholars and judges have addressed these
questions recently.' By and large, those who have written on the
subject have emphasized the limited scope of what Catholic
doctrine requires of judges and the ways in which judges can
justify their apparent deviations from Catholic moral norms. 0
One of the main conclusions that follows from this line of
argument is that cases of true conflict between religious faith
and legal duty are relatively rare. For one, the number of cases
"religion has returned to a largely irrelevant status"); Michael J. Gerhardt, Why the
Catholic Majority on the Supreme Court May Be Unconstitutional, 4 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 173, 174 (2006) (suggesting that "selections of at least some of these [Catholic]
justices may have been unconstitutional ... because they might have been
deliberately based in part on the nominees' religious convictions").
6 See, e.g., Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators,
and Voters, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 211-12 (2007). Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain,
Must a Faithful Judge Be a Faithless Judge?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 157, 158 (2006);
Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, Catholicism and the Court: The Relevance of Faith
Traditions in Jurisprudence, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 166, 166-67 (2006), Edward A.
Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 221, 222
(2006); Scott C. Idleman, Private Conscience, Public Duties: The Unavoidable
Conflicts Facing a Catholic Justice, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 312, 313 (2006); William H.
Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347, 349 (2006).
6 See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 212.
7 Id. at 234-35, 238.
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
1o See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 232-35.
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that present active conflicts between Catholic doctrine and
settled American law is said to be rather small.n For another,
the Catholic doctrine of cooperation is said to allow judges room
to participate in the administration of unjust laws without
necessarily implicating themselves in sin. 2 Further, the role and
obligation of judges in shaping public policy is said to be more
limited under Catholic doctrine than the role of other public
actors.a Finally, in those few instances where there is a genuine
conflict between religious faith and legal duty, the Catholic judge
can simply recuse herself from the case.' 4
This body of literature thus seeks to defend the right of
Catholics to serve on the bench while also reassuring non-
believers that there is nothing to fear from the Catholic
judiciary." But in making this apologia, much of the existing
literature fails to adequately explore the role that Catholic
doctrine implies for itself in important areas of constitutional
jurisprudence. For while it may be true that Catholic doctrine
does not-or need not-compel a judge to deviate from
established legal principals in settled areas of the law, what does
Catholic doctrine say a judge should do when she is operating in
unsettled legal territory? In such cases, the issue is not how a
judge is to resolve a conflict between Catholic doctrine and
settled law-for by definition, there is no settled law to conflict
with. Rather, the issue is how a judge will use Catholic doctrine
in settling the law in the first place.
11 See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 236; see also Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 214-
15.
12 See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 230-36; see also Kalscheur, supra note 5, at
232-35.
11 See Idleman, supra note 5, at 315-16; see also Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 221.
14 See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 214; see also Hartnett, supra note 5, at 257-
64; Pryor, supra note 5, at 361.
1 Fear of and prejudice against Catholics has played a prominent and ugly role
in certain chapters of American political history. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 214-21, 273-82 (2008); see also Sanford Levinson, The
Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1990) [hereinafter Levinson, Catholics Becoming
Justicesl ("Even a cursory look at the historical record involving Catholic Justices
certainly reveals the presence of overt anti-Catholicism."). See generally JOHN T.
McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). Fortunately, the country appears to
have moved beyond such fear and prejudice-at least to the point where six
Catholics can sit on the Supreme Court and where the church's teaching on law,
religion, and public life can be critically analyzed without fanning the flames of
bigotry.
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This Article undertakes an analysis of Catholic doctrine in
this context of unsettled law and judicial discretion. The analysis
focuses on the cases and on the court in which there is the widest
room for judicial interpretation-namely, on the constitutional
cases that come before the Supreme Court. The aim is to
examine whether and to what extent Catholic doctrine offers a
theory of constitutional interpretation that purports to guide the
Catholic Justice in the exercise of her judicial duties. The
analysis aspires to be descriptive rather than normative: It
engages with church teaching in an objective and critical
manner, but neither endorses nor impugns the Church's position.
To be sure, this analysis necessarily partakes of discernment and
interpretation-for there is no explicit church teaching on how
the Constitution is to be understood and applied.16  But
regardless of the challenges that the process of doctrinal
interpretation may present, they are undoubtedly no more
unmanageable or parlous than the challenges presented by
constitutional interpretation itself.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses the
doctrinal writings of the Catholic Church as they relate to
the moral obligations of public actors. As will be seen, these
writings lend themselves to an interpretation that suggests a
strong role for Catholic moral teaching in all aspects of public
life. Part II examines the circumstances in which these writings
may be applicable to the decision-making processes of the
Supreme Court. Cases involving fundamental rights and
liberties are given particular attention in this Section-for these
are cases about which Catholic doctrine often has the most to
say, and in which the potential for judicial lawmaking is often
made most clear. This Section demonstrates that an activist
theory of constitutional interpretation can find ample support in
Catholic teaching. Part III considers the implications of the
activist Catholic theory for judicial nominations, with the goal of
emphasizing the potential relevance of religious doctrine in
the confirmation process. The Article concludes with some
observations about the potential limits of Catholic self-
identification as a predictor of judicial behavior and the need for
further empirical research to measure the actual impact of
Catholic teaching on the judiciary.
'1 See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 229.
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I. CATHOLIC TEACHING ON LAW, MORALITY, AND PUBLIC LIFE
Before commencing the analysis of Catholic teaching on the
role of religion in constitutional interpretation, it should be
acknowledged that the Church's position on this precise subject
has not been explicitly or unambiguously articulated. As
Gregory Kalscheur has argued, "[tihere is no official Church
teaching that defines what the U.S. Constitution means. Indeed,
such a question is beyond the competence of the Church's
teaching office."" Scott Idleman has echoed this view, noting
that "there are few if any authoritative church documents that
speak directly to, or clearly about, a judge's specific obligations."s
But this does not mean that there is a shortage of sources that
speak to the question at hand. To the contrary: The Catholic
tradition contains an abundance of writings that analyze the
relationship between the civil law and the moral law and that
address the obligations of public actors who must confront
questions of law and morality."
We begin with a brief discussion of the writings of Thomas
Aquinas. Aquinas's writings provide useful background for the
instant analysis, both because of their extensive treatment of
various categories of law and because of their lasting influence on
Catholic doctrine.2 0 With respect to legal taxonomy, Aquinas
organizes law into four kinds: eternal law, natural law, human
law, and divine law."' Eternal law is defined as the governance
of all things according to "Divine Reason"-that is, as God's
eternal ordering of the universe.22 Natural law is a set of
17 Id.
" Idleman, supra note 5, at 315.
1o See, e.g., O'Scannlain, supra note 5, at 158-59.
20 The influential status of Aquinas's teaching in Catholic doctrine has
been recognized in a number of official church documents over the centuries.
See, e.g., LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER AETERNI PATRIS 11 17-19 (1879),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_1-
xiiienc_04081879_aeterni-patris_en.html; JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETIER
EVANGELIUM VITAE 9 72-73 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE], available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documente/hfjp-ii-en
25031995_evangelium-vitae en.html; CODEX IURIS CANONICI c. 252 § 3 (Canon Law
Society of America trans., 1983) (1983).
21 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, Q. 90-108, at 993-1119
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1st ed., Benziger Brothers, Inc.
1947) (1265-1274) [hereinafter 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA] (emphasis omitted). See also
O'Scannlain, supra note 5, at 159; BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS
AQUINAS 244-49 (1992).
22 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 21, pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 1, at 996.
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principles of action that are derived from the eternal law through
the use of human reason.2 3 It is these principles of natural law
that provide guidelines for moral living:
Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and
pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to
the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or
avoided.2 4
Human law is in turn derived from natural law and consists
of the particular rules necessary for the ordering of civil society.2 5
Divine law-the revealed law of the Bible-addresses interior
acts, which are untouched by human law, and serves to assist
humans in achieving their ultimate end of eternal union with
God. 6
This Article is primarily concerned with Aquinas's discussion
of the relationship between natural law and human law and its
implications for judicial decision-making. On the one hand,
certain passages in Aquinas's writings could be read to support
the claim that the role of religion and morality in judicial
decision-making should be rather narrow. 27  For example,
Aquinas cites Augustine for the proposition that, with respect to
"earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are
making them, when once they are established and passed, the
judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them."28
Aquinas also maintains that a judge does not necessarily commit
sin in sentencing to death a man he knows to be innocent-"for it
is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who
stated him to be guilty."29 Taken in isolation, these passages
23 Id. at pt. I-1I, Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009.
24 Id.
25 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 3, at 997.
6 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 4, at 998-99.
27 See O'Scannlain, supra note 5, at 159.
28 2 ST. THOMAS AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-11, Q. 60, art. 5, at 1450
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1st ed., Benziger Brothers, Inc.,
1947) (1265-1274) [hereinafter 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA]; see also O'Scannlain, supra
note 5, at 160.
29 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 28, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. In order
to escape sin, the judge must first carefully examine any false witnesses in order to
find a basis for acquitting the defendant and must also attempt to refer the case to a
higher tribunal for judgment. Id. For further analysis of the role of the Catholic
judge in capital cases, see generally John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic
654 [Vol. 85:649
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arguably suggest that the Catholic judge is obliged neither to
question the morality of legislation nor to refuse to apply it, even
if the injustice of its effects is manifest.
But on the other hand, these passages appear in a context in
which Aquinas repeatedly emphasizes that an unjust law is not
to be credited with binding legal status.a" Indeed, Aquinas
insists that "[hiuman law has the nature of law in so far as it
partakes of right reason ... [blut in so far as it deviates from
reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law
but of violence."3 1 Elsewhere, he approvingly quotes Augustine's
dictum that "that which is not just seems to be no law at all" and
holds that "every human law has just so much of the nature of
law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a
perversion of law."3 2 Finally, with respect to judging in
particular, Aquinas states that "if the written law contains
anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no
binding force.... [A]nd consequently judgment should not be
delivered according to them."
Thus, for Aquinas, the task of judging is not simply one of
applying the law as it appears on the books. The judge must
instead look to the character of the law at issue and evaluate its
conformity with natural right and justice; if the law is found
wanting in this regard, it is not to be applied. To be sure, there
may be limits to a judge's obligations to correct or prevent
injustice. Nevertheless, the clear implication of Thomistic
thought is that those who shape and apply the human law must
be guided by the higher moral principles of the natural law. And
as discussed below, this implication has been explicitly adopted
and endorsed in subsequent authoritative Church teaching.
Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998); Hartnett, supra note 5;
Kalscheur, supra note 5.
30 See, e.g., 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 28, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 2, at 1447;
id. at art. 5, at 1450.
31 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 21, pt. I-II, Q. 93, art. 3, at 1005.
32 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 95, art. 2, at 1014 (emphasis omitted).
33 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 28, pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 5, at 1450.
3 Unlike some other religious traditions, the Catholic Church contains a
hierarchical structure that makes it possible to identify authoritative church
teaching-notwithstanding the variety of beliefs and practices that surely obtain
among those who self-identify as Catholic. The official teaching authority of the
church is exercised by the Magisterium, defined as the bishops in union with the
Pope. "'The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether
655
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While most ecclesiastical pronouncements do not speak to
the duties of judges specifically, a number of Church documents
do address the relationship between the civil law and the moral
law and the obligations of public officials generally." The 1987
Instruction Donum Vitae provides an illustrative example."
With respect to the moral law and the civil law, the Instruction
states that "[tihe task of the civil law is to ensure the common
good of people through the recognition of and the defence of
fundamental rights and through the promotion of peace and of
public morality."37 The text concedes that "[iun no sphere of life
can the civil law take the place of conscience or dictate norms
concerning things which are outside its competence. ...
However, the inalienable rights of the person must be recognized
and respected by civil society and the political authority."" The
Instruction goes on to specify the content of some of these
fundamental and inalienable rights:
a) every human being's right to life and physical integrity from
the moment of conception until [natural] death; b) the rights of
in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living
teaching office of the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is exercised in the
name of Jesus Christ.' This means that the task of interpretation has been entrusted
to the bishops in communion with the successor of Peter, the Bishop of Rome
[namely, the Pope]." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 85 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter CATECHISM] (quoting PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION DEI VERBUM
1 10 (1965)). In addition to matters concerning divine revelation, "[tihe authority of
the Magisterium extends also to the specific precepts of the natural law, because
their observance, demanded by the Creator, is necessary for salvation." Id. at
2036. None of the magisterial teachings reviewed in this article purport to be
"infallib[e]"-that is, they were neither issued by the Pope speaking ex cathedra nor
by the College of Bishops speaking "in agreement on one position as definitively to
be held." See PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION LUMEN GENTIUM [ 25
(1964), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/ii-vaticancouncill
documents/vat-iiconst_19641121_lumen-gentiumen.html. Nevertheless, as with all
magisterial teachings on matters of faith and morals, the church obliges individual
Catholics "to accept [these] teaching[s] and adhere to [them] with a religious assent."
Id. The term "religious assent" has been interpreted to mean that Catholics are
obliged to make a sincere effort to reach intellectual agreement with these teachings
and to convince themselves of their truth. See THE HARPER-COLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CATHOLICISM 806 (Richard P. McBrien ed., 1995); RICHARD M. GULA, REASON
INFORMED BY FAITH 155-61 (1989).
3 See CATHECHISM, supra note 34, [ 2238-43.
16 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DONUM
VITAE (1987) [hereinafter DONUM VITAE], available at http//www.vatican.va/
roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con_cfaithdoc_19870222_respect-
for-human-life-en.html.
17 Id. at ch. III.
8 Id.
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the family and of marriage as an institution and, in this area,
the child's right to be conceived, brought into the world and
brought up by his parents. 9
Donum Vitae thus seeks to authoritatively identify both the
purpose and proper content of the civil law and to do so in a
manner that challenges legal and political standards that do not
conform to the Church's understanding of the moral order. The
Instruction also seeks to clarify the duties of public officials in
promoting conformity between the civil law and the moral law:
The political authority is bound to guarantee to the institution
of the family, upon which society is based, the juridical
protection to which it has a right. ... It is part of the duty of the
public authority to ensure that the civil law is regulated
according to the fundamental norms of the moral law in matters
concerning human rights, human life and the institution of the
family. Politicians must commit themselves, through their
interventions upon public opinion, to securing in society the
widest possible consensus on such essential points and to
consolidating this consensus wherever it risks being weakened or
is in danger of collapse....
... All men of good will must commit themselves, particularly
within their professional field and in the exercise of their civil
rights, to ensuring the reform of morally unacceptable civil laws
and the correction of illicit practices.40
Notably, this language is not phrased in aspirational or
hortatory terms; it does not merely state what public officials
should ideally do to shape the civil law. Rather, the text speaks
with the voice of obligation: "[the political authority is bound to
guarantee," "politicians must commit themselves," and so forth.
Through this emphatic language-complemented by emphatic
typeface-the Church makes clear that public officials are
obliged to follow the dictates of moral teaching when exercising
their public duties-not simply when informing their private
consciences.
The Encyclical Evangelium Vitae further emphasizes the
primacy of the moral law over the civil law. Indeed, the moral
law is said to be "the obligatory point of reference for civil law
9 Id.
4o Id.
41 Id. (emphasis added in first quotation and omitted in part in second
quotation).
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itself."4 2  The civil law must, therefore, be brought into
conformity with the moral law-for the "real purpose of civil law
is to guarantee an ordered social coexistence in true justice, so
that all may 'lead a quiet and peaceable life, godly and respectful
in every way.' "'4 Invoking previous papal pronouncements and
the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, the Encyclical reminds readers
that "'laws and decrees enacted in contravention of the moral
order, and hence of the divine will, can have no binding force in
conscience.. . ; indeed, the passing of such laws undermines the
very nature of authority and results in shameful abuse.'"" Thus,
laws such as those legalizing abortion or euthanasia are not
simply ill-advised or unjust; they are corruptions of law and have
no morally biding force.45
Evangelium Vitae insists that the fact that a society is
democratic and pluralistic does not relieve it of its obligations to
follow the moral law.4 6 "Democracy cannot be idolized to the
point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for
immorality."47 Nor can respect for the consciences of others
justify support for or acceptance of immoral law.4 8 To the
contrary, the Encyclical strongly condemns the view that:
[Iln the exercise of public and professional duties, respect for
other people's freedom of choice requires that each one should
set aside his or her own convictions in order to satisfy every
demand of the citizens which is recognized and guaranteed by
law; [and that] in carrying out one's duties the only moral
criterion should be what is laid down by the law itself.49
Public officials are thus obliged not to rigidly separate the
realm of private conscience from public conduct. Rather, they
"are called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to
cooperate formally in practices which, even if permitted by civil
legislation, are contrary to God's law." 0 "Indeed, from the moral
standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate formally in evil....
4 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 20, [ 70.
a Id. at § 71 (quoting 1 Timothy 2:2 (Revised Standard)).
"Id. at § 72 (alteration in original) (quoting John XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
PACEMINTERRIS 51 (1963)).
4 Id.
4 See id. at § 70.
4 Id.
4 See id.
Id. at § 69.
5o Id. at § 74.
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[And] cooperation can never be justified either by invoking
respect for the freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that
civil law permits it or requires it.""
Much attention has been paid to the question of what
constitutes "formal cooperation in evil."5 2 The Encyclical itself
lists political advocacy or voting in favor of a morally invalid
law as examples of such cooperation. 3  Legal scholars have
considered other possible examples and have reached varying
conclusions. John Garvey and Amy Coney Barrett have argued
that a judge's decision to sentence a defendant to death
constitutes formal cooperation, but his participation in the guilt
phase of a capital trial or his refusal to disturb a death sentence
on appeal might not. Edward Hartnett has suggested that even
imposition of a death sentence may not constitute formal
cooperation, provided that the judge does not actually intend that
the sentence be carried out." On the subject of judicial bypass
hearings in abortion cases, Professor Kalscheur has concluded
that some decisions to authorize an abortion may constitute
formal cooperation while others may not.56 But for purposes of
the present analysis, it is not necessary to enter into this
discussion about whether certain activities or decisions
constitute cooperation. For Evangelium Vitae invokes the
doctrine of cooperation only to define what Catholics engaged in
public life cannot do-namely, they cannot formally cooperate
with evil. The concern of this Article, however, is with what
Catholics engaged in public life should do. And on this point, the
Encyclical is clear: Catholics-and indeed "all people of good
51 Id.
" See id. at § 73.
53 Id.
" See Garvey & Coney, supra note 29, at 305-06.
* See Hartnett, supra note 5, at 244-45.
* Specifically, Professor Kalscheur argues that a bypass decision issued on the
grounds that an abortion is in the best interest of the minor "almost certainly"
amounts to formal cooperation. Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 247. A decision issued on
the grounds that the minor is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own,
however, may only amount to "material" cooperation: "[t]he judge might intend only
to apply the law faithfully; he or she does not necessarily issue the order with the
intent that the minor obtain the abortion." Id.; see also Hartnett, supra note 5, at
248-51.
" EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 20, 1 74.
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will""-should affirmatively seek to bring the civil law into
conformity with the moral law when fundamental human rights
are at issue.
The importance of this moral duty has been reiterated by
more recent pronouncements of the Church. In a 2002 Doctrinal
Note, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith counsels
Catholics "that those who are directly involved in lawmaking
bodies have a grave and clear obligation to oppose any law that
attacks human life. For them, as for every Catholic, it is
impossible to promote such laws or to vote for them."" Moving
beyond the context of laws attacking human life, the Note states
more broadly "that a well-formed Christian conscience does not
permit one to vote for a political program or an individual law
which contradicts the fundamental contents of faith and
morals."o The Note explicitly connects a Catholic's moral
obligations to the exercise of her official public functions:
It is a question of the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent,
found within one's conscience, which is one and indivisible.
There cannot be two parallel lives in their existence: on the one
hand, the so-called "spiritual life," with its values and demands;
and on the other, the so-called "secular" life, that is, life in a
family, at work, in social responsibilities, in the responsibilities
of public life and in culture."
Nor can Catholics in public life:
appeal to the principle of pluralism or to the autonomy of lay
involvement in political life to support policies affecting the
common good which compromise or undermine fundamental
ethical requirements. This is not a question of "confessional
values" per se, because such ethical precepts are rooted in
human nature itself and belong to the natural moral law. 62
- Id. The salutation of the encyclical is addressed "To the Bishops Priests and
Deacons Men and Women religious lay Faithful and all People of Good Will...."
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 20.
69 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE THE
PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE 4 (2002) [hereinafter
PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE] (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at http://www.vatican.valroman curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc con_cfaith doc_20021124_politica en.html.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id. at 1 5.
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The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has also
weighed in on the obligations of Catholics in public life, albeit
with less authority and in less detail than the Pope or the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith." Exercising their
duties "as teachers of the Catholic faith and of the moral law,"
the Conference reminded voters prior to the 2004 elections that
"[in the United States of America, abortion on demand has been
made a constitutional right by a decision of the Supreme
Court."' The bishops further reminded their audience that "[tlo
make such intrinsically evil actions legal is itself wrong. "65
Consequently, "[t]hose who formulate law. . . have an obligation
in conscience to work toward correcting morally defective laws,
lest they be guilty of cooperating in evil and in sinning against
the common good."66 It is the duty of all Catholics "to act in
support of these principles and policies in public life. It is the
particular vocation of the laity to transform the world."
Thus, the Catholic Church has consistently taught that the
validity of the civil law is to be measured with reference to the
moral law. The Church has also repeatedly declared it to be an
63 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Catholics in Political






68 This does not mean that every moral wrong must be made into a legal
wrong-for Catholic theologians and scholars have long argued that the aims of the
civil law are generally more limited in scope than the aims of the moral law. John
Courtney Murray has explained the distinction as follows: "The moral law governs
the entire order of human conduct, personal and social; it extends even to
motivations and interior acts. [Civil] Law, on the other hand, looks only to the public
order of human society; it touches only external acts, and regards only values that
are formally social." JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 166 (1960). Professor Kalscheur has
made a similar distinction, noting that to "distinguish public morality (which is a
proper concern of the state) from private morality (whose supervision is beyond the
limited power of the state) is to recognize that not every sin should be a crime; the
state's limited subsidiary purpose is not to 'make' people wholly virtuous through
legal coercion." Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for
U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 30 (2006); see also PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 1 7 (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE]
(setting forth "the right of the person and of communities to social and civil freedom
in matters religious," and holding that "the freedom of man is to be respected as
far as possible and is not to be curtailed except when and insofar as
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obligation of all Catholics to use their political power-whether
as voters or as public officials-to bring the civil law into
conformity with the moral law in matters touching upon
fundamental human rights.69  The Section below considers the
extent to which these teachings apply to the exercise of judicial
power in general and to the exercise of the constitutional
decision-making power of the Supreme Court in particular.
II. CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING AND JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING
As noted previously, the writings surveyed above rarely
mention courts or judges specifically.70 Instead, they direct their
teaching more broadly: toward the "public authority,"" "political
leaders," "those . .. involved in lawmaking bodies," or "[tihose
who formulate law."7 This has led some commentators to
conclude that "most of the authoritative church statements that
address civic duties in regard to law or public policy appear
largely focused on legislators, other elected politicians, and
voters." More to the point, these commentators have suggested
that such statements may not be directed at judges at all. As
necessary"), available at http//www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/ii vatican
council/documents/vat-iidecl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae en.html.
6 Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI has recently reiterated that the protection of
fundamental rights and values-including "respect for human life, its [defense] from
conception to natural death, the family built upon marriage between a man and a
woman, the freedom to educate one's children and the promotion of the common good
in all its forms"-is "not negotiable." BENEDICT XVI, POST-SYNDOCAL APOSTOLIC
EXHORTATION SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS 83 2007), available at http://www.
vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvi/apost exhortations/documents/hf ben-xvi exh
20070222_sacramentum-caritatisen.html. But when fundamental rights and values
are not at stake, public actors must exercise prudence to determine whether a
particular moral evil should be legally prohibited. The prudential inquiry focuses not
only on the nature of the moral evil itself, but also on the likely effectiveness and
potential consequences of a proposed ban. See MURRAY, supra note 68, at 166-67.
Prudential considerations may dictate that certain practices be tolerated under the
law even if they are condemned under Catholic morality; the use of contraceptives by
married couples is one commonly cited example. See Kalscheur, supra note 68, at 27;
John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1049, 1076 (1994).
7 See text accompanying note 35.
n DONUM VITAE, supra note 36.
72 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 20, 1 90.
7 PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE, supra note 59.
7 Catholics in Political Life, supra note 63.
" Idleman, supra note 5, at 316.
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Professor Idleman has argued, "judges really do not 'vote for,'
'promote,' or have the ability to 'repeal' laws, nor are
they ordinarily considered 'law-making bodies.' "76 Professor
Kalscheur has also noted that "the different roles held by
legislators and judges mean that legislators and judges are
usually making very different sorts of decisions."7  Unlike the
role of a legislator:
The role of the judge in our constitutional system is not
primarily or directly to make public policy. Instead, the
primary role of the judge is to use the tools of legal analysis to
interpret the Constitution and laws, and to apply those laws as
they exist in the context of deciding individual cases.
The understanding of the judicial role expressed by Idleman
and Kalscheur is largely consistent with the view endorsed by
Chief Justice John Roberts in his confirmation hearings: "Judges
and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around.
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they
apply them."" Yet in highlighting the distinction between the
role of judges and that of other public officials, the Chief Justice
may be overstating the differences and under examining the
similarities. The claim that judges do not make law may hold
true in some circumstances, but it is hardly accurate as an
overall description of judicial functioning. Indeed, the idea that
judges only apply, rather than create, the law "is a nice slogan,
but any first year law student knows that judges make law
constantly."80 As for the comparison between a Supreme Court
Justice and an umpire:
No serious person thinks that the rules that judges in our
system apply, particularly appellate judges and most
particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given
to them the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires. The
rules are created by the judges themselves. They are created
76 Id.
" Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 221.
78 Id. at 226-27 (emphasis omitted).
I Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States), available at http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shl09-158/browse.html.
s Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006).
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out of materials that include constitutional and statutory
language and previous cases, but these conventional materials
of judicial decision making quickly run out when an interesting
case arises; in those cases the conventional materials may
influence, but they do not determine, the outcome.81
To appreciate the lawmaking discretion of federal judges in
general and Supreme Court Justices in particular, one need only
consider a sampling of what Judge Posner refers to as
"interesting cases"" or Ronald Dworkin-more famously-calls
"hard cases"'-that is, "the ones in which the conventional
materials of judicial decision making just won't do the trick."'
These can include cases in which Catholic doctrine does not have
obvious applicability, such as those involving the reasonableness
of a particular search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
or the permissibility of an election recount under the Equal
Protection Clause." But these can also include cases that fall
within the heartland of Catholic moral teaching. Examples
include cases involving abortion, gay rights, and capital
punishment. In all of these categories of cases, the Supreme
Court has been in a position to make law at the highest level by
granting or denying recognition of constitutional freedoms.
11 Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2006). Professor Neil Siegel offers a similar criticism of the
umpire analogy:
It is impossible for a Justice actually to satisfy the demands of the analogy
because there is no near-determinate rulebook to consult. That is, Justices
cannot "just" decide constitutional cases according to "the rules" because
they cannot agree on what the rules are. And they cannot agree on what
the rules are because they cannot agree on the social vision that the rules
are fashioned to realize. It is precisely because there is no remotely
determinate rulebook that Justices can approach controversial cases with
strong predispositions and can garner the power and prestige associated
with a seat on the Court. It is for good reason that informed people care
deeply about who in particular serves on the Supreme Court of the United
States. Put differently, if the umpire analogy were persuasive, being a
Supreme Court Justice would be nothing to write home about.
Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 701, 710-11 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
82 Posner, supra note 81, at 1053.
' See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1975)
(emphasis omitted).
* Posner, supra note 81, at 1053.
* See Chemerinsky, supra note 80, at 1070.
* See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 85:649664
20111 THE SUPREME COURT'S CATHOLIC MAJORITY
And in none of these cases has the Court merely applied pre-
existing rules to reach its decisions. In its abortion opinions, the
Court has invoked the un-enumerated "right of privacy" and the
un-delimited right of "liberty" in support of its decisions to
recognize a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy." The
Court has appealed to similarly open-textured concepts, along
with "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life," in
recognizing a right to engage in consensual homosexual
conduct. 8  When evaluating challenges to the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has referred to "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society to determine which punishments are so
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual."89 In all of these
cases, the Supreme Court has clearly functioned as a lawmaking
body that has set national policy on questions of fundamental
rights-and it has done so without being guided by text and
precedent alone.9"
87 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
89 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9 If there were any doubt about the Court's lawmaking role in these cases, it
should be dispelled by reference to the dissenting opinions. See, e.g., id. at 608
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's
moral standards-and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility
purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because
I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the
meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the
subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I
dissent."); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion is
the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has
largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda
promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral
opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.... What Texas
has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its
hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional
right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 996
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare
this Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a Volk who will
be 'tested by following,' and whose very 'belief in themselves' is mystically bound up
in their 'understanding' of a Court that 'speak[s] before all others for their
constitutional ideals'-with the somewhat more modest role envisioned for these
lawyers by the Founders.") (alteration in original).
The Supreme Court does not, of course, exercise its lawmaking role only in
ideologically liberal directions. For example, in a series of cases the Court's more
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Stated simply, life-tenured federal judges in the American
constitutional system do perform a legislative role in a very
important class of cases. And they do not necessarily step into
this role only as a last resort after more judicially restrained
avenues have been exhausted. In Posner's view, many judges
actually reverse the sequence: "They start by making the
'legislative' judgment as to what decision would have good
consequences-would be, in other words, good policy-and then
see whether that judgment is blocked by the orthodox
materials."" To be sure, even Supreme Court Justices engaged
in the process of deciding constitutional cases face constraints on
their lawmaking discretion; these include constitutional text,
precedent, and political limits on the enforceability of their
decisions." But it remains the case that "appellate judges when
deciding cases in the open area are political actors-legislators
operating under certain constraints that do not bind the official
legislators, but also, depending on tenure and other factors,
enjoying certain leeways that official legislators don't.""
Supreme Court Justices enjoy the greatest measure of leeway:
They "are like legislators in a system in which there is no judicial
power to invalidate statutes and [in which] legislators once
elected cannot be removed."4
Thus, regardless of whether the Church pronouncements
discussed in the previous Section directly target judges, it is clear
that the teachings logically include them. It therefore follows
that Catholic judges in general and Catholic Supreme Court
Justices in particular "have a grave and clear obligation to oppose
conservative Justices have invoked the concept of "sovereign immunity" to
significantly limit the ability of citizens to sue their own states without the state's
consent. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). As described by one commentator, these are
decisions that "cannot be justified based on the text of the Constitution or the intent
of the Framers. There is no provision concerning whether states can be sued in their
own state courts, and it is something that was never discussed by the Framers."
Chemerinsky, supra note 80, at 1079. For further analysis of this line of cases, see
generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole
Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
9 Posner, supra note 81, at 1055.
9 See id. at 1053-54.
9 Id. at 1054.
9 Id.
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any law that attacks human life," 5 "to work toward correcting
morally defective law [ ],"9 and "to ensure that the civil law is
regulated according to the fundamental norms of the moral
law."9 As has just been seen, the nature of constitutional
adjudication is such that Supreme Court Justices have ample
opportunities to carry out these obligations. For the Supreme
Court often gets the last word on constitutional questions
relating to the beginning and end of life, definitions of marriage
and family, and other fundamental rights that are of major
concern to the Catholic Church." In many of these cases, the
state of the law is sufficiently unsettled as to allow for the
exercise of judicial discretion without running afoul of
unambiguous text or established precedent. The exercise of this
discretion can be guided by a number of interpretive goals, such
as respecting originalism for Justice Scalia or fostering "active
liberty" for Justice Breyer.99 Catholic teaching suggests its own
interpretive goal to guide the exercise of judicial discretion:
namely, the goal of promoting conformity between the civil law
and the moral law.' 00
This appears to be the approach to constitutional
interpretation recommended by the current head of the Vatican's
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, William Levada. In
his former capacity as Archbishop of San Francisco, Levada
issued a statement in which he argued that "[t]he Supreme
Court's judgment about the application of the Constitution
should.. . be guided by the principles of the moral law."'0 '
95 PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE, supra note 59 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9 Catholics in Political Life, supra note 63.
9' DONUM VITAE, supra note 36 (emphasis omitted).
I See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
9 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1051-52. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw (1997); STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
100 See John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social
Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 513, 591-93 (2009) (suggesting that under
Catholic social thought, "a conscientious judge could invalidate an inherently unjust
law if he or she found that it violated 'the objective moral order' by inflicting a gross
evil," and noting that "[tihe open-textured nature of many constitutional
provisions ... invites judicial reasoning that is more overtly normative in character,
especially where other modes of argumentation fail") (quoting DIGNITATIS
HUMANWAE, supra note 68).
1 Archbishop William J. Levada, Reflections on Catholics in Political Life and
the Reception of Holy Communion, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
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Professor Kalscheur suggests that "[ilt is not clear what Cardinal
Levada means here," and cautions that "we need not conclude
that he is arguing that the Supreme Court has the power to
make decisions that comply with the principles of the moral law
even when there is no basis in proper constitutional analysis for
so concluding."102 But Professor Kalscheur's interpretation of the
Cardinal's statement is debatable on at least two grounds. First,
we have seen that the kind of morality-based jurisprudence that
Cardinal Levada appears to be endorsing is well supported by the
authoritative teachings of the Church. 103  Second, we have also
seen that the Supreme Court already has the power to make
decisions that comply with the principles of various ideological
viewpoints, and that it frequently exercises this power in
constitutional cases.10 4 The real question thus becomes whether
the Church's vision of morality is one of the ideological
viewpoints that can properly guide the Court in the exercise of its
discretionary powers.
The Catholic Church itself appears to have answered this
question in the affirmative. Nor has the Church been alone in
making the case for the inclusion of religiously-based moral
reasoning in public decision-making, at least under certain
circumstances. Michael Perry, for one, has argued that "citizens
and even legislators and other public officials [may present, in
public political debate,] religious arguments about the morality of
BISHOPS (June 13, 2004), http://www.catechism.org/bishops/reflections.shtml. Pope
Benedict XVI is also reported to have included Catholic judges among those who are
bound by "the requirements of the natural moral law and the Church's consistent
teaching on the dignity of human life" during a 2009 meeting with former House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, when he spoke of the obligation of "all Catholics, and
especially legislators, jurists and those responsible for the common good of society, to
work in cooperation with all men and women of good will in creating a just system of
laws capable of protecting human life at all stages of its development." Statement of
Pope Benedict XVI, HOLY SEE PRESS OFFICE (Feb. 18, 2009), http://press.
catholica.va/newsservices/bulletin/news/23430.php?index=23430&po-date=18.02.20
09&lang=en. The statement was issued by the Vatican's press office, and does not
constitute authoritative teaching of the Church. Nevertheless, Douglas Kmiec was
prompted to call Benedict's reported statement "quite radical-perhaps
unintentionally so" and to argue that it represented a "sharp ... break" with past
church practice by failing to distinguish between the duties of judges and other
public officals. Douglas W. Kmiec, Catholic Judges and Abortion: Did the Pope Set
New Rules?, TIME.COM (Feb. 20, 2009), httpJ/www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1880977,00.html.
102 Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 229 n.48.
10 See supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
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human conduct."o5 He has also made a stronger claim: that
government may actively disfavor or punish certain conduct on
the basis of a religiously-grounded belief that such conduct is
immoral. 0 Religion can thus serve as a basis both for the
persuasive power of argument and for the coercive power of law.
Notably, Perry has defended the legal and moral legitimacy of
religiously-inspired laws even in the absence of an independent
secular basis for the law in question. 0
Perry's defense of religiously-grounded lawmaking invokes a
number of related arguments. On the practical side, Perry
argues that a requirement that laws have an independent
secular basis would either be enforced so loosely as to render it
meaningless-for some plausible secular ground could always be
thought up for purposes of a court challenge-or so strictly as to
demand that judges act as "supreme arbiters of controversial
moral beliefs."os In addition, "[b]ecause of the role that
religiously based moral arguments inevitably play in the political
process . . . it is important that such arguments, no less than
secular moral arguments, be presented in, so that they can be
tested in, public political debate."o' On the moral side, Perry
expresses concerns about "maintaining impartiality between
religious grounds and secular grounds for moral belief' and of
respecting "the equal citizenship of religious believers.""o In
Perry's words:
[T]o forbid legislators to disfavor conduct on the basis of a moral
belief that has a religious ground unless the belief also has a
plausible, independent secular ground ... would be to import
'05 MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 44 (1997) [hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS].
'06 MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 24(2003) [hereinafter PERRY, UNDER GOD].
107 Id. at 26-28. Perry acknowledges that this position represents a departure
from his earlier writings. Id. at 152 n.28 (citing PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra
note 105, at 30-38). In a more recent book, Perry clarifies this position further, and
argues that government may legislate on the basis of religious premises in the
absence of an independent secular justification only so long as government does not
privilege membership in, or the practices and beliefs of, any particular church. Thus,
for example, government may base laws and policies on "the premise that every
human being has a God-given dignity and inviolability," but not on 'the premise that
Jesus is Lord." MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY,
AND THE SUPREME COURT 207, 219 (2009).
10 PERRY, UNDER GOD, supra note 106, at 28.
*0 PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 106, at 45.
no PERRY, UNDER GOD, supra note 106, at 28.
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into the Constitution a controversial conception of the proper
relation between morality and religion, according to which
morality-at least, morality "in the public square"-can and
should stand independent of religion.... [Ilt would also
unfairly deprivilege religious faith, relative to secular belief, as
a ground of moral judgment-and unfairly deprivilege too,
therefore, those moral judgments that .. . cannot stand
independent of religious faith."'
Put differently, Perry concludes that to limit the role of
religion in public decision-making, or to require that all laws be
supported by plausible secular bases, is to "discriminate" against
religion and religious believers.
To a greater extent than the writings of the Catholic Church,
Perry applies these general arguments about religion in public
life to the specific context of judicial decision-making. In an
appendix to one of his principal works on religion and
government, Perry poses the question directly: Are judges a
special case?" 2 In other words, are judges unique among public
officials in being unable to rely on religious values and
arguments in exercising their public duties? Perry answers this
question in the negative."' He notes that "judges are sometimes
policymakers" who must decide "the direction in which the law
should move.""' In making such decisions, there is no reason
why judges should not be as free as other public officials to
explicitly invoke religious premises, at least where a plausible
secular premise also supports the decision."1s
Stephen Carter shares Perry's concern for the argument for
equal treatment of religion in constitutional decision-making.11
As understood by Professor Carter, an attempt to exclude
religious reasoning from the judicial process "carries an implicit
trivialization of religious faith, and a denigration of religion as
against other ways of knowing."11 Objections to religious
n1 Id. at 30.
112 PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 102-04.
113 Id. at 103.
114 Id. at 102.
115 Id. at 103.
no See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 932 (1989).
n1 Id. at 933.
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reasoning are particularly problematic to Carter given the
widespread acceptance of the fact that judges do engage in moral
reasoning in cases involving fundamental rights:
It is a bit late in the day to argue that when judges decide cases
involving such issues as reproductive freedom or
reapportionment, they are searching for rights that are already
there, just waiting to be discovered. On the contrary, whether
the judge claims to be enforcing the community's moral norms
or updating the moral vision of the Founders, it is quite evident
that the judge cannot make such decisions without relying, at
least in part, on her own moral knowledge....
... The question, then, is whether one can make sense of a rule
prohibiting judges from relying on their moral knowledge if it
happens to have an explicitly religious basis."i8
The claim that religious reasoning should be a prohibited
form of moral reasoning strikes Carter as resting on two dubious
assumptions: that an individual can cast aside her religious
convictions when deciding moral questions 19 and "that religion is
a distorting force in the public dialogue on which liberal theory
depends."12 0 Carter rejects these assumptions, and concludes
that religious reasoning should be acceptable in any case in
which other forms of moral reasoning are also acceptable.12 1
Unlike Perry, however, Carter does not believe that religious
argument should have a role in formal judicial opinions: Judges
"might make decisions on the basis of moral conviction, but they
must justify them in terms of the received norms of judging."1 22
There are, of course, many compelling arguments that can
be-and have been-raised against the use of religiously-based
moral reasoning in judicial decision-making. 1 23 However, it is not
us Id. at 935.
n1. Id. at 940.
120 Id. at 938.
121 Id. at 943.
122 Id.
"2 Perhaps most prominently, John Rawls has argued that, when deciding
questions of constitutional essentials and basic justice, all participants in the
political process should justify their positions in terms of "public reason"-principles
which all participants in the political process can reasonably be expected to
endorse-rather than private "comprehensive doctrines"-visions of the whole truth
of life upon which individuals cannot be expected to reach agreement, such as
religious doctrines. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 765, 765-66 (1997); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM (1993)
[hereinafter RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. The ideal of reliance on public reasons
"applies also in a special way to the judiciary and above all to a supreme court in a
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the point of this Article to assess the merits of these arguments
or to take a position in the larger debate of which they are a part.
Rather, the point is to determine whether the Catholic Church
itself has taken a position on the role of religious morality in the
process of constitutional interpretation.
In order to make this determination, the first Section of this
Article reviewed the doctrinal writings of the Church; 2 4 we saw
that Church teaching emphasizes the obligations of all Catholics
to use their political power to bring the civil law into conformity
with the moral law whenever fundamental human rights are at
stake.12 5 The present Section has considered the applicability of
this teaching to the judiciary.12 6  We have seen that in the
American system, federal judges in general and Supreme Court
Justices in particular frequently function as lawmakers and
exercise significant interpretive discretion in cases involving
fundamental rights and liberties.'2 7  The logical implication is
that the Church's teachings on the role of religious morality in
public life include Supreme Court Justices and other federal
judges. Judges and justices are therefore obliged to use their
judicial power to conform the civil law to the moral law, at least
in those cases where fundamental rights are at issue and the
exercise of judicial discretion necessarily comes into play.12 8 We
constitutional democracy with judicial review." RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra, at 216. For additional discussion, see generally 2 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 497-524 (2008);
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); Mark C.
Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial Decision
Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709 (2004).
124 See supra Part I.
125 See supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
126 See supra Part II.
127 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
12s The questions of which rights are truly "fundamental" and how the law
should best protect them are complex. For present purposes, we can note that the
rights "to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception until death,"
along with "the rights of the family and of marriage as an institution and ... the
child's right to be conceived, brought into the world and brought up by his parents"
have clearly been recognized as fundamental. See DONUM VITAE, supra note 36.
Other rights have also been emphasized in church documents, including a number of
rights relating to social and economic justice-though their "fundamental" status
may be less clear. See Breen, supra note 100, at 529-36 (reviewing and analyzing
various rights discussed in magisterial teaching). Even with respect to the protection
of the most clearly established fundamental rights, the obligations of a judge may be
quite limited under the theory of interpretation set forth in this article-for the
status of those rights may be well-settled, and the issues left open to judicial
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have also seen that this interpretation of Catholic teaching does
not represent such an extreme vision of the role of religion in
constitutional decision-making as to render it implausible. Quite
to the contrary, this understanding of the Catholic theory finds
support in the writings of several legal and political scholars.12 9
In the Part below, we will consider what implications this
interpretation of Catholic teaching may have for the judicial
nomination and confirmation process.
III. CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING AND JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS
Thus far, the analysis in this Article has focused on the
theoretical import of Catholic moral teaching; it has not
addressed the practical impact of that teaching. But the
foregoing discussion does suggest several practical questions that
are worth considering. For example, how have Catholic judges
themselves understood and responded to Catholic teaching on
law, religion, and public life?' Are a nominee's views on these
subjects relevant to the nomination and confirmation process? If
so, how closely should her views be scrutinized? While a
comprehensive analysis of these questions is beyond the scope of
this Article, some preliminary observations are offered below.
Whereas the Church's teaching implies an active role for
religious reasoning in constitutional adjudication, many recent
Catholic nominees to the federal bench have been apt to endorse
a much narrower role for religion in judicial decision-making.'
discretion may be narrow. For example, a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy
before viability is settled law, and even a judge who believes abortion to be a moral
evil could conclude that his discretion is constrained by text or by principles of stare
decisis. See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 241 ("A judge could . .. sincerely (even if
erroneously) conclude[] that the Constitution... does provide protection for the
right to make the abortion decision. Alternatively, a judge could. . . sincerely (even if
erroneously) conclude[] that respect for the rule of law prevents him from voting to
overrule the precedent established in Roe.").
129 See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
I As is the case with many other subjects on which the Church has spoken,
there is sure to be considerable diversity of opinion among the Catholic faithful on
the subject of law, religion, and public life. This Article therefore does not assume
that Catholic judges--or any other Catholics for that matter-necessarily agree with
or follow the Church's teaching on these issues. For further discussion of this point
and of the need for empirical research on the influence of Church teaching on
judicial behavior, see infra Conclusion.
131 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 79; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 566
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Consider the testimony of John Roberts and Samuel Alito during
their respective confirmation hearings. 32 Chief Justice Roberts
summed up his understanding of the role of religion in judicial
decision-making as follows: "[M]y faith and my religious beliefs
do not play a role in judging. When it comes to judging, I look to
the law books and always have. I don't look to the Bible or any
other religious source."' Justice Alito articulated a similar
position: "[M]y obligation as a judge is to interpret and apply the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and not my
personal religious beliefs or any personal moral beliefs that I
have, and there is nothing about my religious beliefs that
interferes with my doing that."13 4
Other Catholic judges have echoed these views. Judge
Diarmuid O'Scannlain has suggested that the Catholic tradition
requires a judge to separate "his knowledge of the law from his
knowledge of morality."3 5  In a like vein, Judge William Pryor
has argued that "the exercise of [his] authority as a federal judge
is governed by the law alone."'*3 This is not to say that religion
cannot play any role in judicial decision-making; Pryor identifies
several ways in which religious faith properly informs the
exercise of his public duties: "[I]n [his] understanding of [his]
oath of office, in [his] moral duties to obey lawful authority, and
in [his] responsibility to work both diligently and honestly." 3 7
None of these ways, however, "involve [ ] using religious doctrine
(2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing] (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Nominee to
be Associate Justice of the United States).
132 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 79; Alito Hearing, supra note 131.
13 Roberts Hearing, supra note 79, at 227; see also Kalscheur, supra note 5, at
219.
134 Alito Hearing, supra note 131, at 566-67; see also Kalscheur, supra note 5, at
219. Unlike Roberts and Alito, Justice Sotomayor did not directly address the role of
religion in judicial decision-making during her confirmation hearings. Nor was she
asked to do so: While members of the Senate Judiciary Committee did ask
Sotomayor about extra-legal influences on her judicial decisions, they did not
specifically identify religion as one these potential influences. Instead, Senators
questioned Sotomayor about the influence of race, ethnicity, and gender in judicial
decision-making, focusing on a speech she gave in 2001 in which she suggested that
a "wise Latina" might reach better judicial decisions than a white male.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 66 (2009) (Statement of Chairman Leahy).
135 O'Scannlain, supra note 5, at 160.
136 Pryor, supra note 5, at 355.
137 Id. at 349.
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to decide a case in conflict with the law."" Indeed, even in hard
cases, "[tihe duty to administer justice requires the exercise of
judgment, but not the employment of religious doctrine as a
source of authority to supplant or evade the law when judging
becomes difficult or its outcome undesirable."' In sum, Pryor
argues, "[t]he Church makes no claim that judges must be moral
philosophers who are empowered to change the law, as they see
fit, in resolving cases."140
These statements indicate that many Catholic judges would
deny that their faith compels them to bring the civil law into
conformity with the moral law. It should be borne in mind,
however, that many of these judges also maintain that they
interpret the Constitution according to its text and original
meaning, and reject the idea that moral reasoning of any kind
plays a role in constitutional adjudication.14 ' We have already
seen that Chief Justice Roberts has characterized judges as
umpires who follow rules instead of making them.14 2 For his
part, Judge Pryor has argued that an objective model of
judging-one that does not allow for moral reasoning or judicial
lawmaking-is "more than alive and well; it is the only
legitimate model for a federal judge." 43 Yet we have also seen
that the notion that judges do not make law is at least debatable,
if not demonstrably false.1" If we reject the premises of the
objective model of judging, should we also reject the claim that
religion plays no role in judicial decision-making?
Justice Scalia has suggested that the answer to this question
may be "yes." 4 For Scalia has acknowledged that his moral
views would be relevant to how he voted as a Justice if he
"subscribed to the conventional fallacy that the Constitution is a
'living document' "-that is, if he accepted that the Supreme
Court's role was to give evolving meaning to constitutional
138 Id.
13' Id. at 358.
140 Id.
141 See supra Part II.
142 See supra text accompanying note 79.
'4 Pryor, supra note 5, at 357.
144 See supra Part II. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK
(2008).
" See generally Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May
2002, at 17, available at http/www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/gods-justice-and-
ours-32.
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provisions. 14 6  Scalia has further acknowledged that his moral
views are informed by the teachings of the Catholic Church, at
least with respect to some moral questions. 4 7 With respect to the
morality of capital punishment, for example, Scalia has
explained: "As a Roman Catholic-and being unable to jump out
of my skin-I cannot discuss that issue without reference to
Christian tradition and the Church's Magisterium."148  This
suggests that if moral reasoning were to enter into the judicial
decision-making process, then religious teaching might inform
that process in at least some cases. Judge Pryor has made a
similar observation: While Pryor denies that judges necessarily
engage in moral reasoning when deciding constitutional cases, he
acknowledges that if they did, "then [he] would find it difficult to
argue . .. that a judge should not be permitted to rely on his
religion as a source of authority in reaching decisions."1'
Thus, some prominent Catholic judges seem to agree that
religious teaching could play a role in constitutional
interpretation-at least in those cases where, properly or not,
judges engage in moral reasoning to give meaning to
constitutional text.5 0 It follows that a nominee's religious views
146 Id. at 17 (noting that his views on the morality of capital punishment "have
nothing to do with how [he] vote[s] in capital cases that come before the Supreme
Court," but that this would not be true if he believed that the Constitution "means
from age to age whatever the society (or perhaps the Court) thinks it ought to
mean.").
m See id. at 18.
11 Id. This is not to say that Scalia's moral views are determined by the
Church's teaching. Again with respect to the morality of capital punishment, Scalia
notes that while he has given the Church's current teaching-which he understands
to be non-binding-"thoughtful and careful consideration," he nevertheless disagrees
with the Church's present position on the subject. Id at 21.
m Pryor, supra note 5, at 356.
150 Though not a member of the federal judiciary, former Texas Supreme Court
Justice Raul Gonzalez has written that his "relationship with God impacted the way
[he] considered and wrote about the issues presented" in several cases. Raul A.
Gonzalez, Essay, Climbing the Ladder of Success-My Spiritual Journey, 27 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 1139, 1157 (1996). In contrast to those "who believe that religious
beliefs should be private and have no bearing on their work," Gonzalez professes to
believe that:
we are called to live our faith full time, not just on weekends, and that all
our thoughts, words, and deeds should be impacted by our religious
convictions. To me, it is an inescapable fact that our perspective on any
issue is influenced by where we place ourselves on the religious spectrum.
To deny this fact is to be dishonest.
Id. at 1147. For further discussion of Justice Gonzalez' views on religion and judicial
decision-making, see Sanford Levinson, Is It Possible To Have a Serious Discussion
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could be relevant to her judicial philosophy and should be open to
some degree of examination in the confirmation process. This is
not to suggest that all of a nominee's religious beliefs should be
subject to scrutiny. Most questions relating to a nominee's
beliefs about God, worship practices, and the like would be
wholly irrelevant to an assessment of her fitness for judicial
office and should have no part in the confirmation process. But
questions relating to a nominee's beliefs about the role of moral
and religious reasoning in judicial decision-making are a
different story. Such questions are directed at an understanding
of a nominee's theory of constitutional interpretation, and are
therefore an appropriate line of inquiry.
The Religious Test Clause"5' of the Constitution should not
be read to prohibit such inquiry. While some commentators have
urged that the clause be broadly construed to preclude any
questions concerning religious beliefs, others have convincingly
argued that this expansive reading would be inconsistent with
constitutional history and common sense.152 As Professor Paul
Horwitz has written, "[ilt is one thing to say that a nominee may
not be forced to adopt or disclaim particular religious views
under oath. It is quite another to say that no one else is entitled
even to consider that nominee's views. "153 Moreover, an open
consideration of a nominee's religiously-informed beliefs "honors
the view that there is nothing about religious beliefs that
presumptively disqualifies them from inclusion in any aspect of
public discussion."154
About Religious Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
280, 284-85 (2006) [hereinafter Levinson, Religious Commitment and Judicial
Responsibilities].
151 The Religious Test Clause provides that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
152 Compare J. Gregory Sidak, True God of the Next Justice, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 9 (2001), with Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The
Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial
Nominations, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2006).
15 Horwitz, supra note 152, at 120.
" Id. at 121-22. For alternative interpretations of the Religious Test Clause,
see J. Gregory Sidak, supra note 152; Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No
Religious Test Clause, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1649 (2007).
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It may be that Catholic judicial nominees have been and will
continue to be asked about their religious views more often than
non-Catholics.15 5 But this scrutiny need not be taken as evidence
of anti-Catholic bias on the part of the Senate or the public.
Rather, the examination of a Catholic nominee's views may
simply reflect acknowledgment that the Roman Catholic
tradition has spoken more vocally and comprehensively about the
role of religion in public life than many other faith traditions.'5 6
Nor does inquiry into the role of religion in constitutional
adjudication necessarily imply doubt about a Catholic nominee's
loyalty to the Constitution.' 7 For as we have seen elsewhere in
this Article, it is widely acknowledged that the process of
constitutional interpretation occasionally requires judges to
engage in moral reasoning-and it is not self-evident that
religious reasoning is any less "loyal" than other forms of moral
reasoning. It therefore implies no disrespect or bias to ask a
Catholic nominee what significance she attaches to her church's
moral teaching as it applies to judicial decision-making. To the
contrary, to ask such questions is to honor all of a nominee's
views with equal respect and consideration: "To the extent that a
secular person can be examined on the implication of her beliefs
for the performance of a public role .. . the same should be true
for someone whose beliefs are presented as religiously based.
This, I believe, is required by our commitment to equality."' 8
1m5 As noted above, however, Sonya Sotomayor-the most recent Catholic
nominee to the Supreme Court-was not asked about the role of religion in her
approach to judicial decision-making. See supra note 134.
156 See Levinson, Catholics Becoming Justices, supra note 15, at 1071 (noting
that "[olne might be more likely to ask Roman Catholic nominees such questions
[about the relationship between natural law and positive law] than, say, Lutherans,
because the Catholic Church has historically insisted on the reality of natural law in
a way that the Lutheran community has not.").
1 Professor Levinson has remarked on "the lamentable anti-Catholicism that
has pervaded much of the American past," and has noted that a common theme in
the confirmation hearings of some Catholic nominees to the Supreme Court has been
"the felt need for reassurance, to put it bluntly, that their primary loyalties were to
the Constitution (and the United States) rather than to the Vatican and the Roman
Catholic Church." Levinson, Religious Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities,
supra note 150, at 282. In response to questions about their loyalties, "Justices
identified with Catholicism have been forced to proclaim the practical
meaninglessness of that identification." Levinson, Catholics Becoming Justices,
supra note 15, at 1049.
.a Levinson, Religious Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities, supra note
150, at 281-82.
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CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this Article has been to discern a
theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a fair and
reasonable reading of Catholic moral teaching. In reviewing the
doctrinal writings of the Church and considering their
applicability to the federal judiciary, we have seen that Catholic
moral teaching asserts a strong role for itself in the process of
judicial decision-making."' From the time of Thomas Aquinas to
the present, the Church has consistently held that public actors
have an obligation to bring the civil law into conformity with the
moral law when fundamental human rights and liberties are at
stake. 60 Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges
frequently perform a lawmaking role in the American system,
and therefore face the same moral obligations as other political
figures under Church teaching.' 6 '
We have also seen that while some Catholic judges deny that
religion influences judicial decision-making, others seem to
suggest that religious reasoning might play a role in those cases
in which other forms of moral reasoning are involved.16 2 The idea
that religiously-informed beliefs should be given the same respect
as non-religious beliefs also has significant support among legal
scholars. But equal respect should also bring equal scrutiny. 6 1
Thus, a judicial nominee's religious views should be open to
exploration in the confirmation process to the extent that they
bear on her larger judicial philosophy.
Yet however appropriate inquiry into a nominee's views on
law and religion may be, the ultimate utility of such inquiry may
prove to be limited. Many nominees-Catholic and non-Catholic
alike-may continue to respond that religion plays no role in
their judicial decision-making or simply decline to answer
questions about their religious views.'" And in the absence of
15 See, e.g., DONUM VITAE, supra note 36.
160 See id.; 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 21, at pt. I-II, Q. 91, art. 5, at
999-1000.
161 See supra Part II.
162 See supra Part II.
16 Levinson, Religious Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities, supra note
150, at 282.
164 The reluctance of nominees to answer questions about the relationship-if
any-between their religious views and their judicial views should perhaps not be
surprising, given that nominees tend to avoid answering most questions that would
yield insight into their judicial philosophies. This pattern of reticence among recent
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information from the nominees themselves, the mere fact of
Catholic self-identification will not necessarily reveal much about
the nominees' judicial philosophies. For Catholic moral teaching
is a complex body of thought that cannot always be neatly
classified as liberal or conservative. On the one hand, the
Church opposes abortion rights and gay marriage, and supports
public funding for faith-based programs and for religious
education."' On the other hand, the Church also opposes the
death penalty and preventive warfare, and supports organized
labor and public health care.'" The jurisprudential approaches
taken by Catholics on the bench reflect this diversity, with some
judges being more conservative and others more liberal. 6 7
Today, when people think of a Catholic Justice they may think of
a conservative icon like Antonin Scalia. However, it should be
recalled that the liberal hero William Brennan was himself a
Catholic.'6  Judge John Noonan has reviewed the decisions of
both Justices, and has not found the opinions of either to be
regularly explainable by reference to religion.169 Indeed, Noonan
has concluded that "[rieligion . .. does not regularly predict how
a judge will vote on a constitutional question. It does not furnish
an explanation of how the judge voted. It does not regularly
distinguish the judge from colleagues who do not share his
religious beliefs."7  Further research--drawing on a larger
nominees-and the shortcomings of the judicial confirmation process more
generally-has been extensively discussed in the legal literature. See, e.g., Elena
Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)); David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of
Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (2008); David R. Stras & Ryan W.
Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1869 (2008) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING
THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)); David A. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J.
1491 (1992).
'6' UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming Consciences
for Faithful Citizenship: A Call to Political Responsibility, 25, 29-30 (2007),
available at http://www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenshiplFCStatement.pdf.
166 Id.
16 See supra Part III.
1 See Horwitz, supra note 152, at 80-81.
169 See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Religion of the Justice: Does It Affect
Constitutional Decision Making?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 761 (2007).
o Id. at 768. Noonan does allow that conscience can influence a judge's
behavior.
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sample of Catholic judges and relying on more rigorous empirical
analysis of their decisions-will help to test the validity of
Noonan's conclusion and to shed light on the question of whether
Catholic teaching has succeeded in influencing American
constitutional law in the manner in which it has aspired to do.
[I]t is this conviction at one's inner core, uniting principles and experience
and empathy, that counts most in judging. It is here that the religion of the
judge-not just this or that particular precept but the whole thrust of the
judge's commitment to God-can make a difference. To measure that
difference, however, belongs not to any human but to God.
Id. at 770.
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